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Abstract 
String theorists are certain that they are practicing physicists. Yet, some of their recent critics deny 
this. This paper argues that this conflict is really about who holds authority in making rational 
judgment in theoretical physics.  At bottom, the conflict centers on the question: who is a proper 
physicist? To illustrate and understand the differing opinions about proper practice and identity, we 
discuss different appreciations of epistemic virtues and explanation among string theorists and their 
critics, and how these have been sourced in accounts of Einstein’s biography. Just as Einstein is claimed 
by both sides, historiography offers examples of both successful and unsuccessful non-empirical 
science. History of science also teaches that times of conflict are often times of innovation, in which 
novel scholarly identities may come into being. At the same time, since the contributions of Thomas 
Kuhn historians have developed a critical attitude towards formal attempts and methodological 
recipes for epistemic demarcation and justification of scientific practice. These are now, however, 
being considered in the debate on non-empirical physics.  
 
Introduction  
Theoretical high energy physics is in crisis. Many physicists may wish to deny this, but it is 
richly illustrated by the heated exchanges, charged manifestos and exclamations of despair in 
highly visible publications. For example, three prominent cosmologists, Anna Ijjas, Paul 
Steinhardt and Abraham Loeb, argued in the February 2017 issue of Scientific American that 
the long favoured model for the early universe, inflationary cosmology, has no data to support 
it and has gone through so many patch-ups that it is now fundamentally beyond testability. 
In fact, the authors contended, those still favouring it are squarely, by explicit choice or 
implicit commitment, marching towards a fundamentally “non-empirical science”  (Ijjas et al., 
2017, p. 39).  
The charge has met with a strong rebuke: Alan Guth, one of inflation’s inventors, 
together with thirty-three equally prominent other signatories, including four Nobel 
laureates, expressed “categorical disagreement” with the Scientific American article (Guth et 
al. 2017).  They are “bewildered” by its criticism: inflationary cosmology is not about any one 
particular hypothesis, but a program, a “class of models” that has actually found “impressive 
empirical success”, because the parameters in these models have been appropriately 
adjusted “as new data come to light.” This course of action is in fact the course that 
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conscientious empiricist scientists should follow, Guth et al. insist, and they conclude that 
“empirical science is alive and well!” 
Is it really? The New York Times reported in June 2017 that researchers at CERN are 
increasingly nervous about the lack of data on the existence of supersymmetry (Overbye 
2017), a key element of string theory, which has not yet shown itself in any of CERN’s 
experiments. Many related searches for dark matter particles—expected to be necessary to 
plug gravity shortages in our cosmologies—have also come up empty handed (Bertone and 
Tait 2018). “Many of my colleagues are desperate”, German theoretical physicist Hermann 
Nicolai was quoted in the New York Times article. The flexibility of theory is considered to be 
particularly problematic: the parameters of supersymmetry, like the hypotheses of inflation 
and dark matter, have been adjusted a number of times so that there always seems to be 
another version that might yet show itself in yet another attempt at observation—so far, 
however, it has not. Particle physicist Sabine Hossenfelder has been most explicit in 
expressing despair, for instance in the pages of Nature Physics: according to her, fundamental 
physics is facing a dearth of data and a bewildering plethora of theories, multiplying primarily 
by what attracts citations and funding. “The current practices in theory development signal a 
failure of the scientific method”, Hossenfelder  believes. She contends that, while 
astrophysicists propose more and more candidates for dark matter, “in the absence of good 
quality measures […] there is no evidence that a theory’s fruitfulness correlates with its 
correctness.” While fashion dictates, objectivity is impaired: “social and cognitive biases” 
have produced “a serious systemic failure.”1  
The carefully muted excitement over the most recent preliminary announcements 
coming from CERN and Fermilab of possible physics beyond the Standard Model illustrates 
both the current apprehension as much as cheer for a promise of a resolution of the dearth 
of data. While results are still inconclusive, there are hopes of eventually confirming novel 
leptoquarks or an anomalous magnetic moment for the muon. Yet, the interpretation of 
Fermilab’s data for the magnetic moment are still debated, as much as they are only 
preliminary, while CERN is working to improve its error bars in its meson decay 
measurements.2 One way or another, the announcement of the results, as experimentalist 
Tomasso Dorigo put it, are “good for particle physics […] because particle physics has been 
dead for a while.” Hossenfelder, in her somewhat characteristic acerbic fashion,  “wouldn’t 
bet” on any new physics materializing.3 Yet, more to the point: it is hardly to be expected that 
these results, if in the end confirmed, will reach directly into the depths of quantum gravity, 
where string theorists traditionally do their work.  
Indeed, the crisis in fundamental physics has manifested itself most markedly in 
discussions on string theory. The subject, however, has remained equally influential as it is 
ambitious. Hossenfelder accuses string theory of a particular disregard for “facts”, which she 
 
1  Hossenfelder (2017), p. 316; see also Hossenfelder (2018); Butterfield (2019). 
2 For more on Fermilab’s results, see e.g. Overbye (2021); Abi et al. (2021); for CERN, see Sample (2021); De 
Vries (2021); and the LHC seminars of 23 March 2021 at https://indico.cern.ch/event/976688/. 
3 Dorigo as in Garisto (2021); Hossenfelder is quoted in Overbye (2021).  
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believes mirrors the familiar disregard in recent political discourse.4 Yet high-energy theorists 
Herman Verlinde and Nima Arkhani-Hamed, both in Princeton, paint a strikingly different 
picture: while they equally lament post-factual politics, they put forward their own sub-
discipline as the bulwark against this alarming trend: fundamental physics and string theory 
are all about, in their words, finding the “Truth with capital T.” The pursuit of these subjects 
would discipline their students into “tolerance, stamina, reflection and the ability to question 
your assumptions.”5 Still, string theory’s critics point especially to its cosmologies as stark 
examples of fact-free physics. 
Fundamental high energy physics does not have a tradition of public conflict. Midway 
through the twentieth century it was the first subject to see large-scale Big Science 
collaboration teams. These, even if fiercely competing with one another, internally upheld a 
cultural norm that valued conformity and team spirit, and suppressed public dissent.6 Its 
theoretical sub-discipline, too, was once an outwardly uniform field in which philosophical 
debate was either absent or quickly stifled.7 Yet, the above suggests that this sub-discipline is 
now becoming increasingly frayed: the disputes on what counts as solid method suggest a 
breakdown of a shared understanding of what exactly constitutes proper evidence and 
rationality in modern fundamental physics.  
Some have begun to argue that physics again needs History and Philosophy of Science. 
For example, Nobel laureate David Gross used to think (echoing  pronouncements of famed 
20th century particle physicist Richard Feynman) that physicists need “philosophers and 
historians of science like birds need ornithologists”—yet, he changed his mind: “we need each 
other”, Gross now believes (Wolchover 2015). Indeed physicists have begun to turn to the 
history and philosophy of science to navigate the problems signalled above. Concretely, 
cosmologists George Ellis and Joe Silk (2014) have argued in Nature that philosopher Karl 
Popper’s criterion of testability needs to be (re)instated to demarcate proper cosmology from 
unwarranted theorizing, such as the construction of multiverse models. At the same time, 
string theorists like Gross are agreeing with philosopher Richard Dawid (2013), who claims 
that string theory necessitates a novel understanding of scientific rationality—an 
understanding in which progress can be attained on the basis of theory alone.8  
This discussion, however, has suffered from the absence of a sufficiently 
historiographically informed perspective. As Thomas Kuhn (1977a) already argued, and as for 
example the history of dark matter research illustrates, science, and cosmology in particular, 
did not progress via Popperian falsification tests: often, theoretical insight preceded 
observation, and for prolonged periods, observation may look entirely equivocal or even be 
 
4 Hossenfelder (2017); On the history of the concept of ‘fact’ in physics, see Ten Hagen (2019, 2021) and De 
Waal and Ten Hagen (2020). 
5 Nima Arkani-Hamed, quoted in Blom and Wessel (2017). 
6 Heilbron (1992); Kragh (1999).  
7 See e.g. Kaiser (2002, 2005, 2011). 
8 David Gross for example extensively discussed and endorsed Dawid (2013) at the 2014 Strings conference in 
Princeton in his plenary lecture (27 June, 2014, Princeton University), in response to criticism that string theory 
lacks empirical connections; see https://mediacentral.princeton.edu/media/1_zmp4cbpn (consulted on 4 
September 2020).  
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absent. In the case of dark matter, existing observations were only construed as evidence for 
dark matter once institutional arrangements (the creation of the discipline of physical 
cosmology) and theoretical preferences (the wish for a closed universe) were aligned such 
that that interpretation became viable—only then were data on galaxies’ rotation curves and 
the dynamics of their clusters conceived as convincing markers of the presence of dark 
matter. So, this is not a story of progress via Popperian falsification attempts (see de Swart et 
al. 2017). Kuhn (1977a) likewise argued that astrology, for example, was falsified many times 
over, yet remained an established empirical source of knowledge for many centuries. In 
Kuhn’s analysis, the demise of its authority was rather due to its failure to produce a puzzle 
solving tradition in which theory could be tweaked or replaced. Astronomy, however, 
retained authority, even though plenty of its pronouncements (like those of, say, meteorology 
or medicine) were regularly falsified too. What these examples illustrate is that attempts at 
falsification are simply not the method by which, historically, science has typically progressed, 
and that it is not by Popperian empirical testability that scholars have ‘demarcated’ science 
from non-science in actual practice. 
Furthermore, if one were to use empirical testability as a demarcation criterion of 
proper scientific practice, as Ellis and Silk suggested, then one would need to have a shared 
sense for when a hypothesis is ‘testable’. Yet, in modern cosmology judgment on what 
theoretical hypotheses may be considered as falsifiable varies considerably. For instance, the 
hypotheses of dark matter and dark energy have been judged to be conventionalist, i.e. illicit 
escapes from falsifying experiments in Popper’s terminology9—the same point that critics 
also level against the inflation scenario. Yet, dark matter, dark energy and inflation are all 
concepts that George Ellis, in a separate publication (2017, p. 24), finds “well-established 
scientific theory”.  We may conclude that a call for testability will likely fail in the concrete 
case of strings and modern cosmology: physicists themselves need not agree what are in fact 
examples of testable science. Judgment on testability of a hypothesis itself appears as theory 
laden and dependent on the perspective of the scholar making it. 
The example of Copernicus is particularly apt for today’s discussion. Copernicus 
proposed his alternative to the fairly successful Ptolemean universe in 1543. Yet, this 
theoretical proposal was basically beyond any meaningful notion of empirical falsifiability. 
This situation persisted pretty much until Galileo pointed the newly invented telescope to the 
heavens and in 1610 observed the phases of Venus. Following Ellis and Silk’s prescription for 
modern cosmology, however, one would conclude that Copernican hypothetical theory 
building ought not to be identified as proper scholarship for many decades. That seems 
awkward: rather, this historical example teaches us, as Kuhn tried to teach Popper, that 
testability is insufficient as a marker of proper cosmological practice. 
Yet, Galileo’s observations were not immediately awarded authority, and Copernicus’ 
ideas were of course notoriously controversial—but not because of their non-empirical 
nature: Galileo still needed to establish the authority of empirical methods. To do so, current 
historiography argues, he also needed to establish the authority of a novel kind of scholar: 
that of a ‘mathematical philosopher’, who believed that valid knowledge could be expressed 
 
9 See Merritt (2017). 
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in mathematical laws, and attained by observation and experiment.10 This kind of identity 
formation and demarcation process, we will argue in this essay, we now see signs of in the 
current dispute about string theory. That observation may yet offer insight into the nature of 
that debate, and how to appreciate it in the dynamics of scientific innovation. To do so, we 
will briefly touch upon Einstein and his biography—at least, on how this functions as a 
resource in current debates about who is a proper theorist, and thus, who holds epistemic 
authority. We will also briefly return to the example of Galileo. 
But let us first digress a little more in philosophy: if Popper’s falsificationalism can not 
act as a referee in the string theory debate, what, indeed, about Richard Dawid’s approach? 
Have argumentative meta-structures for string theory been identified that we can warrant 
epistemologically? Is, then, belief in progress by theory alone justified? 
  
Contra Richard Dawid, Karl Popper and other Viennese  
Richard Dawid, in his important book String theory and the scientific method (2013), has 
identified three types of non-empirical argument that explain trust in string theory. These are 
1) lack of viable alternatives that offer a consistent theory of all fundamental interactions, 
including quantum theory and gravity (‘no-alternatives argument’, or “NAA”); 2) the 
‘unexpected explanation’ (or “UEA”) of facts and concepts that follow from the theory, like 
black hole entropy; and 3) the ‘meta-inductive’ notion that string theory is modelled on earlier 
theories that did find direct empirical warrant after first being endorsed due to a lack of 
known satisfactory alternatives (“MIA”); these earlier theories should presumably include the 
Standard Model of particle physics and general relativity—yet, this seems awkward, since e.g. 
Einstein was live testing general relativity to the observed perihelion motion of Mercury as he 
progressed to his theory, while alternatives circulated. In any case, Dawid has additionally 
claimed that these three types of arguments deserve further confidence, as one can offer 
Bayesian accounts that suggest that the likelihood of a certain theoretical hypothesis 
increases if it is of one of the above types.11 Finally, as pointed out already, he believes that 
in string theory, by virtue of the authority that its adherents award the above type of 
arguments, we are facing a novel kind of scientific practice: “a shift in the balance between 
theoretical and empirical elements can be observed,” even if, when available, the empirical 
is still the final arbiter.12   
Yet, already the example of Copernicus suggests that the sentiment that string 
physicists’ weighing of theoretical evidence is without precedent may not hold up to the 
 
10 On Galileo, see Biagiloi (1993), Heilbron (2010); on the introduction of the experiment and identity of the 
experimenter in the early modern period, see also, e.g., Shapin (1994). 
11 Dawid et al. (2015); Dawid (2020).   
12 Dawid (2013, p. 2) argues that in theory assessment, criteria “have been significantly transformed in  
fundamental physics in recent decades.” His 2013 book aspires to identify “the conceptual basis for the new 
aspects of scientific reasoning and […] why this altered conceptual basis has occurred.” Indeed (p. 4), “the book’s 
core message” is that “the novelty of current theories in fundamental physics is not confined to the conceptual 
level of those theories themselves. Rather, it extends to the meta-level of theory assessment where a shift of 
the balance between empirical and theoretical can be observed.” On the point of the novelty of string theory 
methodology, see also Dardashti and Hartmann (2019), in particular pp. 3-5. 
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scrutiny of historical comparison. This, I imagine, could be a reassuring observation for string 
theorists—yet, it also deserves to be pointed out again that empiricism had little authority at 
the time of Copernicus. Furthermore, it is generally wise to be mindful of the inevitably 
particular and contingent character of each and any individual historical case, before drawing 
general conclusions. 
In any case, it would be a moot point whether the example of Copernicus would or 
would not fit Dawid’s NAA, UEA or MIA, and Dawid’s analysis does not aim at historiography. 
Rather, his arguments are focussed on theory assessment: Dawid has primarily aimed to 
identify and offer epistemic license for certain kinds of non-empirical reasoning. Yet, his 
arguments have been drawn into debates about demarcation and justification of research 
programs, as they are held to assist in deciding on a course of action when doing research: 
persist in string theory and multiverse modelling, or not.13 It is for this reason that they have 
attracted the attention of Gross and string critics like Ellis and Silk.  
Such an application, however, reminds us of the old separation between contexts of 
discovery and context of justification, which presupposed that one can assess a theory’s 
viability independent of the contingencies of the work done to construct it. The distinction 
was once introduced by Hans Reichenbach and Karl Popper to separate for philosophy the 
project of justification, that would be done objectively, from the subjective and logically 
opaque nature of actual research.14  
The suggestion of objectivity will make it attractive to string theorists such as Gross to 
invoke Dawid’s arguments to justify string theory’s dominance. Yet, a neat separation 
between the context of discovery and the context of justification,  Thomas Kuhn complained, 
“does not fit observations of scientific life.”15 As he elaborated after comparing historical 
cases of theory choice, such as phlogiston versus Lavoisier’s oxygen or Copernicus’ versus 
Ptolemeus’ solar system: “Considerations relevant to the context of discovery are […] relevant 
to justification as well; scientists who share the concern and sensibilities of the individual who 
discovers a new theory are ipso facto likely to appear disproportionally frequently among that 
theory’s supporters”—just like David Gross in the case of string theory. Kuhn’s examples were 
meant to illustrate that a choice of theory often only appears clear in hindsight: ‘crucial’ 
experiments are only performed or recognized as such once a theory has already become 
established. Clean logical presentations for the cases of Copernicus or Lavoisier typically 
ignore the incommensurability of competing positions and the messy situation of prolonged 
stasis and stalemate in which evidence is entirely equivocal. Kuhn: “That is why it has been 
difficult to construct algorithms for theory choice.” 16 History taught him that choice of theory 
 
13 See Dawid (2019) for his discussion of this point.  
14 For a recent discussion, see e.g. Arabatzis (2006).  
15 Kuhn (1977b), p. 327. 
16 Kuhn (1977b), p. 328. 
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does not follow the neat recipes that formal epistemologists, Bayesians included, were trying 
to pin down.17  
Why bring up Kuhn’s criticism of Popper and the logical empiricists of more than half 
a century ago in today’s discussion of string theory? Because the positions of Ellis, Silk and 
Dawid echo those of the earlier period. Popper and Reichenbach wished to resolve the 
problem of induction and the challenges that it produced for empiricist accounts of 
demarcation and confirmation: Reichenbach proposed a probabilistic and Bayesian 
perspective on the latter, while Popper tried to circumvent the issue by emphasizing 
falsification instead of confirmation in methodological assessment. Both were addressed by 
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), which implied that these perspectives fail in 
comparison with the actual historical record: they do not capture how choice of theory is 
made in the actual practice of science. In Kuhn’s analysis, science is conducted in paradigms 
that colour and condition both experiment and assessment, as illustrated by his famous duck-
rabbit analogy. Theory choice, Kuhn’s historical examples of Darwin, ether and phlogiston 
aimed to exemplify, takes place in a way that resembles the weighing of values in moral 
judgment, rather than that it follows falsificationist prescriptions or Bayesian-style recipes: 
one weighs certain theoretical virtues, just like one weighs moral values.18 Even if today’s 
historical study of science has moved beyond Kuhn when it emphasizes the conditioning done 
by scientific practice over the role played by paradigm, it has moved in the opposite direction 
of Popper and Reichenbach. 
So, did Dawid succeed where, if one were to follow Kuhn, Karl Popper, Hans 
Reichenbach and other Vienna-style twentieth century empiricists failed? That is: Did Dawid 
(who, true to form, also hails from Vienna) succeed in offering an account of theory choice 
for the case of non-empirical science, while his predecessors still aimed to capture and 
validate a version of the empirical method?  
Given Kuhn’s criticism of such accounts in the case of empirical science, it may be wise 
to lower expectations when they are applied in the case of non-empirical science and string 
theory. I do not wish to criticize Dawid by lobbing up the familiar arguments against 
Bayesianism (as there are: prior probabilities, etc.19), and I am happy to acknowledge that 
UEA, NAA and MIA do capture some elements of the argumentative structures that play a 
role in assessing string theory. Yet, I also believe that historiography teaches that we cannot 
expect such reductionist accounts to capture the full practice of theory choice in physics—or, 
to put it differently, they do not represent some boiled down essence of, in Kuhnian parlance, 
the full dynamics of paradigms. Since the time of the logical empiricists, historiography of 
actual science has taught that that broader kind of a perspective is needed to understand how 
scientific rationality does function. Dawid’s arguments may thus also be of limited value in 
 
17 On the insufficiency of Bayesian accounts of theory choice, see Kuhn (1977b), pp. 328-329; for an attempt to 
bridge the differences between Kuhn and logical empiricism via Bayesianism, and an indication of its inherent 
limitations, see Salmon (1990). 
18 See on this point particularly Kuhn (1977b). 
19 See e.g. Talbott (2008) for an overview of the subject. 
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understanding what is at stake in debates about post-empirical physics and the status of string 
theory as proper science.  
A relevant point to observe is that there is hardly a theorist today that does a Bayesian 
calculation before deciding on a theory or research program—and there is no theorist who 
finds that kind of analysis convincing when it goes against his or her existing convictions and 
commitments, just as Kuhn argued in the case of more straightforwardly empirical science. 
This is illustrated by how two prominent adherents of a competitor program to string theory, 
Carlo Rovelli and Lee Smolin, have taken exception to Dawid’s analysis itself. They deny the 
applicability and authority of NAA and MIA in favor of string theory, as they claim that the 
same arguments work just as well for their loop theory of quantum gravity, and that, in any 
case, Bayesian confirmation and non-empirical arguments are epistemically far too weak to 
license belief.20 Their positions may well be countered21—yet, from Kuhn’s perspective, such 
objections are exactly the kind of point you expect scholars in a competing paradigm to bring 
forward.   
Then, the above may suggest that, rather than formal epistemology, a perspective that 
addresses theory choice as rational but embedded in the dynamics of paradigms and the 
conditioning of practice may be better suited to offer understanding of the debate on non-
empirical physics. One instrument to study practice in relation to theory assessment is the 
perspective of epistemic virtue. This focuses on the virtues (broadly, not just morally 
understood) deemed necessary for a scholar to attain knowledge. As such, it reflects the 
culture of doing science related to a particular paradigm.  
A focus on virtue has received novel impetus in history and philosophy of science,22 as 
may be illustrated by the recent contribution by D.J. Hicks and T.A. Stapleford. They have 
argued, drawing on work by moral philosopher Alisdar MacIntyre, that to understand the 
communal and normative nature of scientific practices, we should appreciate that certain 
dispositions to think, act and feel according to particular models of excellence are expected: 
forming a scientific practice involves broad ethical stances and accounts of virtue. When these 
are recognized, there will be confidence that particular scholars aim at the intrinsic epistemic 
values of a discipline; and that they weigh these appropriately, for instance in relation to 
personal rewards. Such dispositions are taught, and they are debated, particularly when a 
discipline’s boundaries are at stake. In the case of controversies, debates about the future of 
a practice often entail competing historical narratives. As Hicks and Stapleford put it: 
“arguments over the present always entail reinterpretations of the past.”23 
Examples are easy to find: in the late nineteenth century, British debates on the proper 
role of the imagination, versus observation and experiment, manifested themselves as, e.g., 
discussions about who was to be assigned priority for the law of energy conservation—Julius 
 
20 Cited on p. 2 and p. 1 in Dawid (2020);  Smolin (2014); Rovelli (2019).  
21 Dawid (2020, pp. 2-5) discusses Smolin’s criticism. 
22 For references that particularly relate to historiography, see for example Daston (1995); Söderqvist (1997); 
Stump (2007); Daston and Galison (2007); Kidd (2014); Bellon (2015); Stanley (2017); Pennock (2019); for an 
overview of primarily  philosophical literature, see Turri et al. (2017).  
23 Hicks and Stapleford (2016), p. 472.  
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Mayer or James Joule. In a related development, energy physicist P.G. Tait vehemently 
debated social philosopher Herbert Spencer on the merits of a priori reasoning; they 
particularly contested aspects of Isaac Newton’s biography, and argued over the correct 
reconstruction of Newton’s priority debate with Leibniz. In these debates, attributions of 
virtue and vice were essential to demarcate proper practice from false avenues.24 As we will 
see, varying accounts of Einstein play a similar role in today’s dispute over the empirical.  
Of course, historiography with a focus on virtue is hardly a panacea to answer any or 
all questions about proper practice for today’s physics—yet, as the above suggests, it may 
give us helpful insight into the process of identity formation and the establishment of 
authority in scientific innovation. These aspects do play a role in the current assessment of 
string theory—that is, in the assessment of string theorists as physicists. 
 
Authority and Identity  
Is string theory proper physics? In history of science, one has generally shied away from taking 
a normative role, given the contingent character of past science: History does not prescribe 
solutions, even if one does learn from history.25 One way to contextualize the question above, 
and to make it more amenable to historical analysis, is to translate it into the question: are 
string theorists proper physicists? That question reflects indeed one level at which the debate 
is taking place: debates about demarcation are inevitably debates about identity, in relation 
to authority. These questions are also tied to discussions about funding, which helps to 
explain why the issue is so contentious. 
One way to address the above questions is to address scientists’ beliefs regarding the 
correct way of being to attain knowledge—how one believes knowledge is attained and what 
norms and dispositions this requires:  what epistemic virtues  one subscribes to and what role 
they play in doing theoretical gravity studies. Ideals of epistemic virtue are intimately tied up 
with the practices performed and theoretical principles held dear: both are associated with 
one’s sense of professional identity. They are reflected in the idealized yet abstract concept 
of the ‘persona’: the archetypical ‘scientist’, ‘physicist’ or ‘theorist’ that is internalized and 
adhered to as an example. Thus, they have an immediate effect on the production of 
knowledge.26 As we will see, these may also inform and reflect attitudes towards the 
empirical.  
What epistemic virtues are observed by the relevant scholarly groups, and how have 
they grown historically? What virtues and norms have theoretical physicists perceived to hold 
scientific authority before—what were the norms and values by which they have held in the 
 
24 Yeo (1988); Smith (1998); Higgitt (2007); Saarloos (2017); Saarloos (2021). 
25 See for instance Kragh (2019), who offers the example of Victorian soliton-like atom building as a forewarning 
for string theory attempts; for a general discussion of how historiography may inform the present, see Guldi and 
Armitage (2014); for a discussion of its relevance to history of science, see the discussion section in Isis 107 (2), 
pp. 309-357, 2016. 
26 On the role of epistemic virtues and persona in scholarship, see e.g. Daston & Sibum (2003); Daston & Galison 
(2007); Shapin (2008); Paul (2011); Wang (2012); van Dongen and Paul (2017); Tai (2017). 
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past that knowledge can be attained? How has that translated into the weighing of various 
kinds of principles, evidence and the instantiation of different knowledge practices? To 
address these questions, one needs to see what the ideal has been of a good physicist, or, 
indeed, a good scientist and how that ideal has evolved.27 
These questions can inform us in the debate about the empirical. For instance, today 
string theorist Leonard Susskind and cosmologists Ellis and Silk will agree that the persona of 
the ‘philosopher’ is to be shunned by proper physicists. Yet, Ellis (2017) expresses that string 
theory cosmology is to be “regarded as philosophy”, and not science, while Susskind, invoking 
the authority of his professional identity as a physicist, dismisses demands for empirical 
falsifiability as merely ‘philosophical’ (Kragh 2014a). Already in 2005, he dismissed such 
demands as naïve and denounced those who raised them as “Popperazi” (Gefter 2005). To 
Susskind ‘confirmation’ is what really matters, regardless whether that is exclusively 
theoretical. Indeed, string theorists find confirmation when observing agreement amongst 
themselves regarding a particular hypothesis (Polchinksi 2019a). Their critics, however, point 
out that such a culture of conformity leads to group-think (Smolin 2006a).  
Dissent does not fare well in today’s funding arenas. It is not hard to imagine that 
many referees like to reward proposals in which they see their own opinions reflected;28 a 
tendency to confirm rather than to disagree is then effectively a beneficial trait, even if 
‘conformity’ will generally be considered a vice. This circumstance may amplify certain 
practices of rationality or particular forms of knowledge instead of others: conformity favors 
further calculation of established ideas over disputes concerning principle.29 Stances on 
proper epistemic attitudes—that are related to ideas about what are ideal scholars, deserving 
of funding—clearly matter for the kind of rationality and evidence considered. This is a 
consequence of their intrinsically social nature.30  
Ideals and norms are increasingly globally shared as science itself has moved from the 
local to the global in the last half century. It has done so particularly in the field of theoretical 
high-energy physics, which was the first to introduce global online preprint publishing in 1991: 
the ‘arXiv’. This accelerated an already strong tradition of international collaboration and 
 
27 We strongly sympathize with the approach taken in the study by Gilbert and Loveridge (2020), who discuss 
differences in epistemic, social and physical positions between string theorists and loop quantum gravity 
theorists. Their synchronic-statistical (rather than diachronic and historiographical, as argued here) survey 
focuses on differences in physical, social and epistemic “tastes”. It shows that historical conditioning (with string 
theorists inheriting positions from particle physics, and loop theorists inheriting positions from relativity) are 
highly determinative of correlative positions.  
28 For recent modeling on harmonization of epistemological stances due to competitive funding practices, and 
further references on this point, see Avin (2019).  
29 Gilbert and Loveridge (2020) argue that their statistical survey of quantum gravity scholars reveals “a 
confirmation of objectivity through intersubjectivity”; objectivity “manifests itself as standards for stylistic 
consilience.” They found that “this mode of investigation existed predominantly, though not exclusively, in string 
theory as compared to loop quantum gravity” (pp. 23-24).    
30 Likewise, Bezuidenhout et al. (2019) argue that an imbalanced role of the virtue (or vice) of ‘docility’ in 
university education has lead to an unwarranted and uncritical dependency on established experimental 
protocols in the life and social sciences, and point out that this plays an important role in the current “replication 
crisis” (p. 82). They further insist that virtues need to be appreciated in their social embedding, for instance in 
the teaching context. 
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refereeing, in part promoted by Cold war contexts and the physical scale of high energy 
experiments.31 The above developments, in the context of centralized funding competitions, 
do suggest the existence of institutional conditions amenable to the harmonization of 
epistemological stances,32 and the marginalization of dissenting points of view and 
subcultures: they promote situations in which, indeed, there is ‘no alternative’. Such a 
dynamic, however, remains hidden from view in formal confirmation theory. One may then 
hesitate to follow Dawid, who takes the point that a large majority believes that alternatives 
are lacking as a starting observation for the Bayesian warrant offered by his No Alternatives 
Argument for string theory.   
Scientific innovation can be accompanied by the introduction of novel ways of being. 
These also introduce conflict of authority and identity. In this regard, the string debate mirrors 
controversies surrounding Einstein and Galileo, who themselves were part of a process of 
forging new identities, precisely along the theory vs. experiment dichotomy: Einstein was 
both the icon and iconoclast example of the novel theoretical physicist, while Galileo 
established the authority of the ‘mathematical’ philosopher who trusted experiment and 
observation. Their innovations, too, were accompanied by questions about the authority of 
their novel brands of scholarship; in their cases, just as in the example of string theory, 
debates raged whether their kind of knowing was proper: whether Einstein was really a 
proper physicist, and whether Galileo should be awarded the authority of the philosopher. 
We will return to the case of Einstein in the next section, but it is instructive to first briefly 
pay some more attention to the example of Galileo.   
Galileo started off as a professor of mathematics in Pisa, which put him pretty low on 
the social-epistemological ladder of his time: somewhere among the musicologists and 
engineers, and definitely a few rungs below proper philosophers. He debated those on a 
number of occasions, for instance on the subject of buoyancy, when he reproached the 
Aristotelians for their ignorance of mathematical methods and general lack of novelty. Yet, 
both were foreign to the socio-professional ethos of the Aristotelians; embracing these would 
mean to award them an authority they lacked in their world, thus unduly elevating Galileo’s 
kind of scholarship. The debate had moral overtones—slavish Artistotelianism was contrasted 
with narcissistic daring—that signal the demarcation of identities, and, in the words of 
historian Mario Biagioli, “the possible emergence of incommensurability.”33 In the end, by 
becoming court philosopher at the Medici court in Florence, Galileo fashioned a position that 
came with the power and opportunity to gain acceptance and authority for a novel kind of 
epistemic identity: that of a scholar who trusted mathematical and empirical methods first, 
and who argued his positions with a heavy dose of wit and rhetorical sharpness. The novelty 
and controversies associated with empiricism were appreciated at court, but not at traditional 
universities. To secure the position, Galileo had prominently introduced some of his newly 
discovered celestial bodies into the local Medici mythology, thus boosting the social standing 
of his observational methods—yet their authority was not absolute and was still highly 
 
31 On 20th century globalization of science in the cold war context and the role of physics in it, see e.g. Krige 
(2006); van Dongen (2015); Krige (2016). 
32 Avin (2019).  
33 Biagioli (1993), p. 236. 
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precarious, just as his own, as he subsequently found out in his run in with the church and its 
scholars.      
In today’s debate, Ellis and Silk (2014, p. 323) have made the point that “journal editors 
and publishers could assign speculative work [such as string theory and multiverse 
cosmology] to other research categories—such as mathematical rather than physical 
cosmology—according to its potential testability.” Thus, string theorists and multiverse 
cosmologists would be denied authority as physicists. Such arguments do suggest that, as in 
the case of Galileo, a new identity is indeed forming, centering on ‘non-empirical’ physics—
even if, at the moment, despite its successes and institutional dominance, this finds itself in 
“a no-man’s land between mathematics, physics and philosophy that does not truly meet the 
requirements of any” in the judgment of Ellis and Silk (p. 321).34 The subject still needs to find 
its social space and the associated epistemic authority. 
So, paradigm changes can be accompanied by the creation of novel scholarly 
identities, and a related debate over values and virtues; this helps to explain why Kuhn argued 
that choice of theory is like moral judgment. A focus on epistemic virtue makes that link even 
more direct, as the familiar example of objectivity illustrates: the virtue of objectivity implies 
a moral economy of the self, just as much as it constrains scientific practice.35 It is not hard to 
imagine a similar functioning for particularly theoretical virtues—‘simplicity’, e.g. in relation 
to ‘unification’—and indeed they have functioned as such, for example in the case of Einstein. 
His example is in fact particularly relevant, as Einstein also debated the merit of a version of 
non-empirical physics. Furthermore, he often features in current discussions on string theory, 
invoked by both its proponents and their critics. 
 
Einstein and non-empirical unification physics: epistemic virtues  
Today, among scientists as much as the general public, the quintessential example of a 
physicist is of course Albert Einstein. Among physicists themselves, he is furthermore the 
leading example of a theorist, particularly due to the successes of his theory of relativity. Yet, 
both the authority of the theory of relativity, and Einstein as a scholar, were debated at 
various times early in the twentieth century. Debates ranged from mild mannered exchanges 
with e.g. Hendrik Antoon Lorentz on the merits of the ether,36 to tense standoffs with 
reactionary ‘anti-relativists’ like experimentalist Philipp Lenard. Let us first briefly consider 
this second episode.  
In the late nineteenth century, the subdiscipline of theoretical physics was a fairly 
recent phenomenon. It had come into existence following the creation of novel professorial 
chairs that were meant to alleviate the teaching load of professor-directors of university 
 
34 For a discussion of string theory as wedged between physics and mathematics, see Galison (2004); an earlier 
study of its relation to the empirical is Galison (1995); for more on the string theory debates and boundary 
discourse, see Ritson and Camilleri (2013).  
35 Daston and Galison (2007); a similar argument can be made for the empiricist virtue of exactitude that was 
taught across the sciences and humanities in 19th century Germany; see ten Hagen (2021). 
36 See e.g. letters contained in Kox (2008) and the discussion in Kox (1988; 2019, pp. 68-73). 
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research labs.37 Originally in a subordinate position, the subdiscipline grew in esteem and 
authority, particularly due to the development of the electron theory, quantum physics and 
relativity—which accelerated following the public success of Arthur Eddington’s eclipse 
observations of 1919.38 This produced a backlash in the next decade and beyond: noted 
experimentalists as Lenard and Ernst Gehrcke took exception, and, joined by conservative 
philosophers and engineers, an anti-relativity movement ensued. Einstein represented much 
that was disliked about the post-WWI order: as a leftist and Jew, he quickly became identified 
as yet another cultural revolutionary, who in his case sought to bring down long-established 
concepts as the ether and preferred frames of reference. Einstein did so with a particularly 
mathematical theory, his critics pointed out. That was one reason why they were unwilling to 
award him and his work epistemic authority: Einstein’s abstract contribution was unnatural 
and superficial. Its rise to prominence was an expression of a moral decay in society, which, 
with the ascent of theoretical physics, prominent in liberal Berlin, and the perceived 
marginalization of experiment and experimenters, was seen to have expanded into physics.39 
This example once again illustrates that in paradigm change, judgments of theory, and of what 
it means to be a proper scientist, stand in an inextricable relation to one another. In the end, 
of course, it was exactly Einstein’s relativity that established him as a novel disciplinary icon.  
Let us leave the case of the anti-relativists. There is another instance in Einstein’s 
biography in which the identity of the theorist was an issue, and in that case, he himself 
articulated how non-empirical theory construction was a valid pursuit; he did so by arguing 
for the epistemic benefit of its practice—which, in his judgment, equally demanded a 
particularly virtuous disposition.  The case at hand is Einstein’s search for a unified field theory 
that he undertook for many years.40 Its goal was to unify in one mathematical description the 
classical gravitational and electromagnetic forces, in such a way that the observed quantum 
nature of matter was reproduced, particularly through the derivation of some solitonic 
elementary particle solution of a novel set of field equations. The effort was usually 
conducted without any concrete empirical input, and did not lead to observable predictions; 
it was primarily mathematical in nature. Earlier in his career, as in the examples of his light 
quantum hypothesis or the electrodynamics of moving bodies, Einstein’s theory construction 
did directly engage with the empirical. He himself observed a shift, too:  
Coming from a skeptical empiricism à la Mach, I have become, through the problem of 
gravitation, a converted rationalist, that is, someone who believes that the only reliable source 
of truth can be found in mathematical simplicity.41  
 
37 Jungnickel and McCormmach (1986). 
38 On this point, see e.g. Staley (2008); Beyerchen (1977).  
39 The literature on anti-relativists is substantial, see e.g.: Forman (1984); Schönbeck (2000); Rowe (2012); van 
Dongen (2007; 2012); Wazeck (2013).  
40 The following is based on van Dongen (2017); for a more straightforwardly historical-technical treatment of 
Einstein’s work on unified field theory without the emphasis on virtue, see van Dongen (2010). Other pertinent 
discussions of Einstein’s unified field theory work are found in Vizgin (1994); Sauer (2006, 2014); Goenner (2004; 
2014).  
41 Einstein to C. Lanczos, 24 January 1938, Einstein Archive, Jerusalem, call number 15-268 (cited on p. 259 in 
Holton 1988).  
14 
 
Einstein’s construction of the general theory of relativity used ideas and methods that one 
can identify as typically grounded in physics (e.g. the equivalence of gravitational and inertial 
mass, Newtonian gravity), and ideas and methods that were more directly derived from a 
mathematical body of knowledge (general covariance, the Riemann tensor).42 In his later 
recollections of his road to general relativity, made when he pursued unified field theory, 
Einstein over-emphasized the role of mathematics, at the expense of the contributions that 
followed from his physical strand.43 Striving for ‘mathematical naturalness’ and 
‘mathematical’ or ‘logical simplicity’ were terms that he used more or less interchangeably 
when discussing his unification attempts and his recollections of formulating general 
relativity. For example, Einstein wrote to David Bohm in 1954:  
I believe that these [unified field theory] laws are logically simple and that the faith in this logical 
simplicity is our best guide, in the sense that it suffices to start from relatively little empirical 
knowledge. If nature is not arranged in a way corresponding to this belief, then there is no hope 
at all to arrive at deeper understanding. […] This is not an attempt to convince you of anything. 
I just wanted to show you how I came to my position. The realization that in a half empirical 
way one could never have arrived at the gravitational equations for empty space had a 
particularly strong influence on me. In that case, only the viewpoint of logical simplicity can be 
of help.44 
But Einstein did want to convince Bohm of something: namely that his efforts in unified field 
theory, controversial among the latter’s generation of theorists,45 were a valid attempt, 
despite its record of failure and problematic relation to the empirical.46  
To drive his point home, Einstein enlisted his own biography and in particular his 
success with general relativity, aware of his stature among Bohm’s generation.47 He did so in 
a way that emphasized and tied together the epistemological benefit and required personal 
virtue of these efforts. For example, Einstein argued that trusting the empirical—as quantum 
physicists had done—while believing that “facts by themselves can and should yield scientific 
knowledge” was grounded in a “prejudice.”48 To change theories because of a conflict with 
 
42 See Janssen et al. (2007).  
43 See e.g. Einstein (1933); van Dongen (2010). John Norton (2000), however, does not believe that Einstein’s 
later recollections are off; yet Janssen and Renn (2007) do; Renn and Sauer (2007) offer a treatment of Einstein’s 
road to relativity that is less pronounced on this issue.   
44 Einstein to D. Bohm, 24 November 1954, Einstein Archive, Jerusalem, call no. 08-054 (cited on pp. 181-182 in 
van Dongen 2010). 
45 For critical attitudes among Bohm’s generation of Einstein’s unification attempts, see e.g. the judgment of 
Abraham Pais (1982), pp. 325-354; pp. 460-469, in particular p. 325 and pp. 349-350; and Robert Oppenheimer, 
cited in: Bird and Sherwin (2006), p. 64; Schweber (2008), pp. 276, 279.  
46 Einstein (1933) argued in his lecture at Oxford University on methodology of theoretical physics and his 
unification attempts that the empirical was primarily involved in testing of theory, but that the road from the 
empirical to the formulation of theory was rather tenuous and insecure (see also Norton 2000; van Dongen 
2004). He did, however, during the 1920s hypothesize the existence of ‘ghost’ charges and other possible 
material-inertial explanations for the geomagnetic effect, and considered to accommodate for those in field 
equations of a unified field theory. In this case, the empirical then did contribute to the formulation of theory in 
a more direct fashion. The attempt did not bear any fruit; see Illy (2019).  
47 To get a sense for how high Einstein was held in esteem by the next generation of physicists, see e.g. 
Heisenberg (1989). 
48 Einstein 1949, p. 49. 
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experiment was “trivial, imposed from without”; striving after unification and logical 
simplicity followed a “more subtle motive.”49 Similarly, Einstein confided to the young 
mathematical physicist André Lichnerowicz that if the unification program would fail, 
understanding “the physical world […] superficially” was all that remained, just as he wrote 
to Max Born that mere “humans are usually deaf to the strongest arguments, while they are 
constantly inclined to overestimate the accuracy of measurement.”50 Yet, “a true theorist” is 
convinced that comprehension is “built on premises of great simplicity” (Einstein 1950, p. 13): 
unifying is to aim for true understanding, and not the superficial of the empirical; to unify 
required to stand firm against the vices of prejudice and superficiality.  
So, Einstein’s epistemic convictions were intimately related to his sense of personal 
virtue. Striving for understanding itself was virtuous, as Einstein wrote in an essay on ‘Good 
and evil’ (1934): “[I]t is not the fruits of scientific research that elevate a man and enrich his 
nature, but the urge to understand, the intellectual work.” Furthermore, finding 
understanding in physics implied unifying: Einstein, in his own words, concerned himself “first 
and foremost” with the “logical unity in physics […] to understand the existing, real world. […] 
[T]he totality of logically independent axioms, stands for the ‘un-understood remainder’.”51  
His unified field theory efforts may not have been successful, but as they aimed at true 
understanding, they offered elevation—and, possibly, personal deliverance and liberation—
as one tried to “arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built 
up by pure deduction.”52  In an article entitled ‘Religion and science’, he expressed that 
“individual existence is a sort of prison and one wants to experience the universe as a single 
significant whole”; aspiring to grasp this “cosmic religious feeling” was “the strongest and 
noblest motive for scientific research. Only those who realize the immense efforts and, above 
all, the devotion without which pioneer work in theoretical science cannot be achieved are 
able to grasp the strength of the emotion out of which alone such work, remote as it is from 
the immediate realities of life, can issue” (Einstein 1930, pp. 41-42).   
The personal virtue and promise of deliverance that Einstein ascribed to attempts to 
find a unified description of the universe resonated with his Spinozism: all who had made 
similar attempts and achieved any success, had equally been “imbued with the truly religious 
conviction that this universe of ours is something perfect and susceptible to the striving for 
knowledge. If this conviction had not been a strongly emotional one and if those searching 
for knowledge had not been inspired by Spinoza’s Amor Intellectualis Dei, they would hardly 
have been capable of that untiring devotion which alone enables man to attain his greatest 
achievements.”53 Spinoza, in his Ethics, had argued that man’s moral well-being lies in a life 
spent on the pursuit of knowledge, particularly knowledge of the eternal laws of nature—that 
is, the laws of an infinite yet deterministic universe, or, synonymously for Spinoza, God: the 
better we understand His true ideas, the more equipped we are in dealing with life’s 
 
49 Einstein 1950, p. 16, p. 13. 
50 Einstein to A. Lichnerowicz, January 1954, Einstein Archive, Jerusalem, call no. 16-319; cited in van Dongen 
(2010), on p. 5; Einstein to Max Born, 12 May 1952, cited in van Dongen (2017), p. 68.   
51 Unpublished manuscript by Einstein, dated 1931, Einstein Archive, Jerusalem, call no. 2-110. 
52 Einstein (1918), p. 247. 
53 Einstein (1948), pp. 56-57. 
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disturbances. Einstein famously agreed with Spinoza’s view of an impersonal yet existing God, 
and shared with him a sense that religiosity was really the “confidence in the rational nature 
of reality as it is accessible to human reason. Wherever this feeling is absent, science 
degenerates into uninspired empiricism.”  
Following the methodology of mathematical unification was also epistemically 
successful, Einstein claimed. For example, in his Spencer lecture at Oxford university in 1933 
‘On the method of theoretical physics’, Einstein argued that the “simplest”, i.e. unified, 
equations for ‘semivectors’ (these were his alternatives for spinors) “furnish a key to the 
understanding of two sorts of elementary particles, of different ponderable mass and equal 
but opposite electrical charge [i.e. electrons and protons].”54 The result proved spurious,55 
however, as was usually the case in his unified field theory efforts. Most importantly, he 
would regularly make the methodological point by offering his recollection of his path to 
general relativity—as he wrote to his collaborator on semivector theory, the mathematician 
Walther Mayer: “one should look for the mathematically most natural structures, without 
initially being bothered too much about the physical, as this brought the desired result in 
gravitation theory.”56 Thus, he enlisted his biography, and his iconic and exemplar status 
among theorists, to argue for his kind of unification physics. He offered himself, his version of 
how general relativity had been found, as an ultimate and indeed virtuous example—as 
exemplary authority—in his disputes on the proper nature of how to do theoretical physics. 
These disputes addressed whether unified field theory efforts had a proper place in theory: 
they did, so the argument would go, because he was a proper theorist, of proven sound 
judgment and appropriate dispositions.  
Yet, many of his peers disagreed, particularly on the latter point—when it came to 
Einstein’s unification physics. The younger generation of quantum physicists—just like the 
philosophers of the Vienna circle—had particularly admired Einstein as the empiricist icon 
that had created the special theory of relativity, in which the coordination of spacetime points 
to events was given by observational operations.57 The general theory was of course 
considered Einstein’s greatest triumph, and his recollections of that period were not disputed, 
but his being an exemplary unification physicist, remote from the empirical, was. Dismissal 
could take a moral tone, for instance when Robert Oppenheimer deemed that Einstein had 
been “wasting his time.” In fact, he had gone “completely cuckoo”, Oppenheimer added in 
private, or, as he put it in public, Einstein had “lost contact with the profession of physics.” 
Clearly, the Einstein of unified field theory was not a proper theorist.58    
 
54 Einstein (1933), p. 301. 
55 Van Dongen (2004; 2010), pp. 96-129 (chapter 5). 
56 Einstein to W. Mayer, 23 February 1933, Einstein Archive Jerusalem, call no. 18-163, cited on p. 119 in van 
Dongen (2010). 
57 For admiration of Einstein as empiricist icon, see e.g. Heisenberg (1989); Heisenberg here further recalls his 
surprise when Einstein explained to him in 1926 that he no longer held empiricist views. In 1927, Heisenberg 
signaled a difference of opinion regarding the role of ‘simplicity’ and the empirical with Einstein (Heisenberg to 
Einstein, 10 June 1927, cited on p. 467 in Pais 1982); Einstein himself was well aware of his isolation and the 
negative judgment of his peers; see Pais (1982), p. 462. See Howard (1994) on the logical empiricists. 
58 Bird and Sherwin (2006), p. 64; Schweber (2008), pp. 276, 279; see also Pais (1982), pp. 325-354, 462. 
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In the absence of the empirical, Einstein emphasized the merit of his personal 
epistemological conviction, along with its success as documented in his version of his 
biography: the epistemic benefit of doing unified field theory was bound up with the virtuous 
dispositions of his kind of theorist. Critics like Oppenheimer disagreed: a unified field theorist 
à la Einstein was not a proper physicist. Likewise, string theorists believe that progress in 
physics is possible without the empirical, and, as we will see in the following section, that 
some of their peers are in fact exemplary physicists; their critics disagree, and are of the 
opinion that a scholar who practices science without involvement of the empirical may be 
many things, but not a physicist.  
 
Crisis in physics and epistemic virtue: the string theory debate  
String theorist Brian Greene (1999, p.15), in his book on “The Elegant Universe”, considers 
Einstein’s unified field theory attempts a “quixotic quest” that had indeed “isolated” him.59  
Yet, unlike Oppenheimer, Greene finds that “Einstein was simply ahead of his time”, and he 
identifies Einstein’s project with that of string theorists: “his dream of a unified theory has 
become the grail of modern physics.” Clearly,  Einstein is presented by Greene as both 
example and justification: the pursuit of string theory is appropriate and honorable, in light 
of the Einsteinian pedigree of the project. This, as we will see, is repeated by others: Einstein 
is invoked to argue in favor of (or indeed also against) string physics. Thus, the dispute about 
the authority of string theory manifests itself as a dispute about what is a physicist, and what 
the attributes of good physicists are—even if these latter are not being sourced in steep 
Spinozist accounts. 
Conceptions of our self and of our professional identity—‘who you are’ and how you 
expect to do science—are tied to what epistemic choices are awarded authority. 
Consequently, our practice of rationality is reflected in the epistemic virtues we appreciate. 
Indeed, according to the prominent string theorist Joseph Polchinksi (2019a, 2019b; 
Polchinski passed away in 2018), string theorists are virtuous: they overcome conservatism, 
aim to be “true to the science”; they are “broad” and “original” physicists. Field theorist 
Steven Weinberg was an important example to Polchinski: Weinberg would have the 
independence, “clarity of mind” and “integrity” not to take shortcuts: when trying to find 
answers to theoretical problems, he would aspire to make a minimum of assumptions. String 
theory’s critics, Polchinski found, need to be more patient and open minded:60 when physics 
moved from the optical to the atomic scale, which took 300 years to achieve, it only had to 
cross four orders of magnitude on the energy scale; now, string theory is attempting to bridge 
 
59 Greene (1999), p. 15; in Greene’s opinion, the isolation was particularly due to a lack of consideration of 
nuclear forces. Einstein considered these to be of only secondary importance; solving the problem of unification 
came first.   
60 The survey of Gilbert and Loveridge (2020) taught them that string theory is (in contrast to loop quantum 
gravity) “more inclusive of diverse tastes and is therefore more successful in germinating research” […]. This 
helps to explain its epistemic, financial and institutional dominance, in their view, as string theory’s “aesthetic 
regime is better aligned with the situational demands and compromises generally faced by late twentieth/early 
twenty-first century research fields”. Inclusivity, however, only applies to choice of problems and methods 
internal to string theory, but not beyond (p. 22). 
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another twenty-five orders of magnitude. Demanding the availability of “direct observation” 
in such a leap reflects a scientific methodology that is “too rigid”.  
Although Weinberg’s professional drive may inspire string theorists, it reminds Lee 
Smolin (2006a) of a counterproductive competitive streak. Smolin is less concerned about the 
non-empirical nature of string theory but is frustrated by its dominance. He believes that 
“new values and attitudes” are needed for the problems that quantum gravity poses. Smolin 
explicitly identifies the crisis in physics as tied to a choice of identity and virtue: according to 
him, physics needs a “seer”, willing to question established principle; seers are “critical” but 
“not competitive”. In Smolin’s judgment, however, funding structures reward “craftspeople”, 
who confirm the consensus with “technically sweet solutions”. Dissent requires “character” 
and “courage”, but these, Smolin believes, are under-valued.61 
Polchinski gave another example, besides Weinberg, that inspired his efforts: Albert 
Einstein, and in particular the Einstein “that […] finished the general theory of relativity” and 
contributed to quantum mechanics—yet not so much his “philosophical bent.”62 Smolin, too, 
chooses Einstein as role model, but indeed rather emphasizes his “more reflective, risky and 
philosophical style.” That would be needed today, since the “harsh and aggressive” way of 
working, taught at Harvard by the likes of Weinberg, has not had any successes after 
establishing the Standard model. The “Einsteins […] think for themselves and ignore the 
established ideas of powerful senior scientists.”63  
Einstein himself actually categorized scholars in fundamental physics in a way that is 
similar to Smolin’s. In a letter to his close friend Paul Ehrenfest—both were frustrated by rapid 
developments towards the quantum theory—he found that:  
There are those that vex principles [“Prinzipienfuchser”] and virtuosi. All three of us [i.e. Einstein, 
Ehrenfest and Niels Bohr, whom Ehrenfest was arranging to meet up with Einstein] belong to the 
first kind (at least the two of us) and have little virtuosic talent. So effect at encounter with distinct 
virtuosi (Born or Debye): discouragement. By the way, it works similarly the other way around.64 
In the same letter, Einstein expressed that he was no longer thinking about experiments on 
the wave and particle properties of light, and that one “will never arrive at a sensible theory 
in an inductive manner”, even if “fundamental experiments” could still be of value—once 
again deprecating the quantum program’s empirical slant. He identified some of its 
proponents (but, notably, not Bohr) as working in a way that was different from his own: Max 
Born and Peter Debye (a former student of Arnold Sommerfeld, like many other prominent 
quantum scholars) were seen as exponents of a technically savvy yet less fundamentally 
oriented kind of physics.65 As it turned out, with the relocation of the epicenter of physics 
 
61 According to Gilbert and Loveridge’s survey (2020), loop theorists identify with “visionary” (truth oriented, 
monistic, qualitative) epistemic “tastes”, whereas string theorists correlate strongly with “pragmatic” (i.e. 
quantitative, aimed at rapid discovery, pluralistic, utility focused) epistemic tastes. String theorists further show 
a preference for an “interdependent” rather than an “autonomous” social taste in their research.  
62 Polchinski (2019a), pp. 349, 342 respectively. 
63 Smolin (2006a), p. 294. 
64 Einstein to Paul Ehrenfest, 18 September 1925, Einstein Archive 10 111; translation as in van Dongen (2010), 
pp. 162-163, which also discusses the letter in the context of Einstein’s attitude in unification physics. 
65 For a discussion of the Sommerfeld school as a training ground for ‘virtuosi’, see Seth (2010). 
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from Europe to the United States and the practice and scale of physics in the context of both 
the Second World War and Cold War, philosophical reflection on principle came to be seen 
as an unprofessional activity for a career-minded physicist.66  
 Smolin recognizes that trend, too, and laments it. He remembers being taught in the 
1970s at Harvard, where “the spirit was pragmatic; ‘Shut up and calculate’ was the mantra”; 
those that reflected on principles were seen as “losers who couldn’t do the work.”67 Yet, 
following a study of Paul Feyerabend and his own predilections, Smolin came to the conviction 
that dissent and debate on principles is now necessary in quantum gravity, where a 
“revolution” is required; yet string theorists, he believes, are technical craftsmen that are 
suited for conformism and “normal science”, but not seers who naturally and openly debate 
foundational assumptions.68  
 The prominent arenas of string theory indeed do not exhibit a culture of open debate 
on issues of principle. At the Strings 2018 meeting in Okinawa, for instance, the organizers 
invited questions from the participants to be discussed by a panel in a plenary session. “The 
large majority, or rather, the plurality of questions”, chair David Gross observed, “have to do 
with connections between string theory and the real world, experiment.” Such questions 
typically asked “how long can string theory survive without experimental verification?” 
Revealingly, most contributors decided to submit their questions anonymously, which was 
hardly a surprise to any of those present. The opinion leaders on stage, one after another, 
then unanimously denied having any concern about the perceived lack of empirical 
connections, to which there were no follow-up questions from the audience;69 such goings 
on do not exactly suggest a safe space for open discussion.  
Yet, it would be wrong to follow Smolin in his characterization of string theorists as 
not interested in the foundations or principles of physics: subjects as holography, the 
information paradox or indeed the multiverse do obviously address issues of ‘principle’. String 
theorists may prefer calculation over foundational reflection, though—while Smolin’s own set 
is quite at home in the latter.70 
 With this difference in mind, it cannot be surprising that different versions of what 
kind of quantum gravity researcher is needed are articulated, and that different aspects of 
Einstein’s biography are highlighted. The latter are both more or less grounded in the 
historical Einstein—but their difference illustrates the larger point: they signal, as 
articulations and demarcations of scholarly identities and exemplars, a Kuhnian episode of 
crisis and possibly paradigmatic innovation. Paying attention to these articulations will 
illustrate how differences of practice are translated into differences of epistemology. Insight 
into the debate regarding the role of the empirical—and its stalemate—may then come from 
historiographical appreciation of the various cultures of theory. 
 
 
66 Schweber (1986); Kaiser (2002; 2005; 2011); Camilleri (2009).  
67 Smolin (2006a), p. 312. 
68 See Smolin (2006a), chapters 16-20 (pp. 261-351).  
69 Strings 2018, 29 June 2018, Okinawa, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PlbGhv0nmJ8 (session title “50th 
anniversary”; consulted on 24 September 2020).  
70 See e.g. Smolin (2006b) for a philosophically informed discussion on ‘background independence’.  
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And yet, philosophy 
The example of Einstein is a reminder that there is an ontological dimension to the debate on 
what is the proper form of rationality. Einstein’s criticism of the quantum theory by way of 
the EPR argument was linked to what he believed to be real and fundamental; this, in turn, 
informed what he considered to be a proper explanation and ‘result’; and all these positions 
were reflected in his practice of unified field theory.71 The point is: there is a link between 
belief about what is in the world, and what counts as explanation. Furthermore, and more 
directly on topic: what one considers to be in the world also informs what one considers to 
be ‘empirical’.  
And what may be considered ‘empirical’? As we saw earlier in the case of testability, 
we again observe that physicists may have very different appreciations of what may be 
considered ‘empirical’.  For example, noted string theorist Eva Silverstein (2019, p. 373) 
emphasizes that string theory “participates in empirical science in several ways.” Namely, it 
suggests constraints on early universe cosmological model building, has inspired certain 
scenarios for dark energy and inflation, uses “thought experiments”, and produces spin-offs 
such as supersymmetry, which may in principle yet be testable. To many, however, these will 
be quite heterodox examples of what may constitute “empirical science”.  
Yet, even while arguing that string theory does contribute to empirical science, 
Silverstein also suggests that the epistemic merit of the empirical is over-rated: 
Even in empirically established theories, we empirically test only a set of measure zero of their 
predictions. A plethora of such tests can provide compelling evidence for a theory, which makes 
further predictions beyond those explicitly tested. It is not ever the case that all of a theory’s 
predictions are empirically verified.72 
The point will look familiar to philosophers: the above is a version of the problem of induction 
(on steroids). Silverstein does not question the merit of inductive knowledge, however, and 
depends on it in her own arguments, for instance when claiming that “strong evidence for 
string theory locally [i.e. in our universe] would support its global predictions for a 
landscape.”73 According to her, in quantum cosmology “valuable science” is also done the 
other way around, from the general to the particular: by “excluding potential alternative 
theories based on theoretical consistency criteria” in the “vast theory space” of the string 
landscape.74 The point, to this interpreter, has a distinctly Kantian echo: in order for us to be 
able to know the world (i.e. for it to be “internally consistent”75), it must have particular 
features (“constraints on parameter space”76), and these we can establish a priori. Indeed, 
 
71 Van Dongen (2010), chapter 7. 
72 Silverstein (2019), p. 373. 
73 Silverstein (2019), p. 372; she adds in a footnote an even stronger version of the same point, attributed to 
Andrei Linde, who would have argued that “the universe hypothesis is no more conservative than the multiverse 
hypothesis in the sense that both refer to physics outside of our empirical view.” 
74 Silverstein (2019), pp. 367-68. 
75 Silverstein (2019), p. 367. 
76 Silverstein (2019), p. 367. 
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Silverstein appears to by-pass the problem of induction and to secure progress by theory by 
reinstating the synthetic a priori. She uses the language of information theory to do so:  
Information is maximized when the probabilities are equal for a set of outcomes, since one learns 
the most from a measurement in that case. The existence of multiple consistent theoretical 
possibilities implies greater information content in the measurements. Therefore, theoretical 
research establishing this (or constraining the possibilities) is directly relevant to the question of 
what and how much are learned from the data.77 
In other words, a priori adding (i.e. positing “multiple consistent theoretical possibilities”) or 
excluding theories and universes  (“constraining the possibilities”) expands our knowledge of 
the world (that is: amounts to a synthetic judgment) because they alter the probability 
distribution of (in principle) possible “outcomes”. This can be done rationally by insisting on 
virtues like, particularly, “consistency”. This, then, leads Silverstein to conclude that, e.g., “the 
landscape has led to new empirical [or, rather: synthetic] information about the early universe 
and provided for a consistent interpretation of the dark energy.”78    
 Even though in his early career Einstein disliked Kant, he was aware of and explicit 
about the Kantian nature of his later unification project. String theorists, however, not so 
much. Some may even be uncomfortable to find themselves identified with a Kantian agenda: 
Kant, after all, is quite a ‘philosopher’, and no one appears happy to be seen to do 
‘philosophy’. Yet, that sentiment only highlights that our disciplinary demarcations are 
primarily a consequence of institutional labeling: they do not reflect any intrinsic epistemic 
necessity. Indeed, it seems at least as valid to claim that Kantian philosophy was an essential 
element to the articulation of the law of energy conservation79 as to argue, with Silverstein, 
that studies of the landscape hypothesis contribute to empirical cosmology. In light of that 
comparison, the Kantian nature of string theory may actually be construed as an argument in 
favor of its practice. Still, Silverstein’s playing up of the empirical credentials of string theory—
while deemphasizing the necessity of the role of the empirical—serves primarily the purpose 
of arguing for string theory as a subject of physics; keeping a distance from philosophy is part 
of that effort.  
Indeed, Joseph Polchinksi described himself as a “practical physicist” who does not 
“use expressions like ‘post-empirical’”; not exactly partial to philosophical reflection, he 
added that if only the Planck scale were attainable at LHC levels, “we would not be sitting 
around here whining about falsifiability.” He added that restraining physics to scales 
accessible to “direct observation” would render science “too weak”; it would be “to decree 
that some aspects of the natural world are outside of its domain.”80 Polchinski, too, believed 
that string theory did relate to the empirical, in particular since “only the multiverse made […] 
the prediction most worth making” in cosmology—that the universe’s vacuum energy was 
finite and non-zero, as (arguably) observed in 1997.81  
 
77 Silverstein (2019), p. 368. 
78 Silverstein (2019), p. 371. 
79 On Kant’s influence in the case of energy conservation, see e.g. Heimann (1974).   
80 Polchinksi (2019a), p. 340. 
81 Polchinski (2019a), p. 348. 
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Polchinski referred for this prediction particularly the review article on “The 
cosmological constant problem” by Stephen Weinberg from 1989, which briefly discussed 
inflationary multiverse ideas among a number of “Anthropological Considerations” that 
support a cosmological constant reasonably close to the currently accepted number.82 Yet, 
that discussion predates modern string theory versions of the multiverse: so to frame 
Weinberg’s account as a prediction articulated by the latter appears at face value as an 
example of rather Whiggish historiography. More fundamental, however, is the question 
whether any multiverse account can be seen as “predictive” in a sense that is familiar in 
physics: in this account of cosmology, the laws of nature of our universe have become 
contingent and local, ultimately only picked out among an infinitude of universes, laws and 
parameters because these laws and parameters allow for life as we know it: the coincidence 
of the environment that we live in then determines the laws, rather than that the laws 
determine the environment.83 When following through on that logic, simply observing that 
we find ourselves in our life supporting version of the universe can then be crafted as an 
empirically meaningful statement.84 One might object, however, that the parallel universes 
invoked to explain the existence of ours are beyond our ability to observe: they are 
inaccessible in principle (Ellis 2017), which can hardly reinforce the empiricist credentials of 
the multiverse scenario.  
Yet, no single string theorist will deny the ultimate authority of observation in 
empirical science.85 In fact, string theory originated in the S-matrix program for nuclear 
interactions: this program was principle-driven but still depended strongly on empirical 
input,86 just like the broader particle physics tradition in which it has always been embedded. 
This dependence changed when the theory began to be considered as a theory of quantum 
gravity. Yet we currently do not have a full historical-philosophical grasp of how that affected 
the implicit epistemological positions of the subject, and how these developed over time.87 
Yet, such historical understanding will be essential to see how its positions today regarding 
the role of the empirical came about, and thus in understanding the current differences of 
opinion: more historiography of string theory is needed. 
To develop historical understanding of what is considered empirical by string theorists, 
one also needs to develop a sense of the subject’s ontology, and the history thereof. Today, 
 
82 Weinberg (1989), pp. 6-9; on p. 7, Weinberg mentioned that “[i]n a model of Linde […], fluctuations in scalar 
fields produce exponentially expanding regions of the universe, within which further fluctuations produce 
further subuniverses, and so on. Since these subuniverses arise from fluctuations in the fields, they have differing 
values of various ‘constants’ of nature.” This brief discussion of multiverse ideas was included as one of a number 
of scenarios that Weinberg discussed as anthropic accounts.    
83 Kragh (2009), in particular p. 540.     
84 String theorist Robbert Dijkgraaf made this point in a recent public debate on the empirical nature of string 
theory (“Bèta break”, University of Amsterdam, 28 November 2017).   
85 Yet, like Einstein, they may not insist on its necessity in creatively formulating theories: see his “On the 
method” (1933).  
86 Cappelli et al. (2012); Rickles (2014). It should be noted, however, that in 1970 Fermilab terminated all but 
one of its novel theory group members after only less than two years when the group gravitated from 
phenomenology to dual models and thus away from experiment; see Hoddeson et al. (2008), pp. 139-141.  




for example, linking  semiclassical gravity in the AdS space of the AdS/CFT correspondence to 
“physics that is measurable on our planet” may be achieved in condensed matter systems, in 
the words of a group in Leiden that works on this subject.88 Yet, that raises immediate 
philosophical questions: since the two descriptions, valid in different regimes, are related by 
a duality, what does a description in terms of one theory actually tell us about the life of 
objects in some ‘real’ world caught by the other description? For example, it has been 
suggested that in the AdS/CFT duality, one side of the duality can be seen as being emergent 
from the other side—how would that impact the sense of description across the duality?89 
And how would that change in case of an identity relation across the duality? The important 
point is: answers to such ontological questions impact on whether dualities explain, what they 
are in fact explaining, and how those explanations relate to the empirical world. Furthermore, 
these answers may differ between communities.  
Opinions about what is ‘real’ will affect which argument or calculation convinces. 
When asking ontological questions, it will not be enough to simply state, as Polchinksi did, 
that string theory “exists” and that e.g. the black hole microstates “can be understood” in 
string theory, via, for example, the Strominger-Vafa analysis.90 Even though this example is 
often cited as a success of string theory, its appreciation depends on how one assesses the 
underlying duality-type relationship: are the two systems—the microscopic D-brane system 
and the thermodynamic black hole—truly the same? Or is the numerical identity between 
entropies simply an accidental consequence of the mathematical peculiarities of the theories 
involved? After all, the entropy counting in the D-brane system is performed with the 
gravitational force turned off. Can one then legitimately speak of a black hole?91 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, string critic Lee Smolin is willing to entertain a “pessimistic point of view” on 
the latter point.92 So, to assess what is rationally considered evidence in string theory, one 
needs to address—and at times assist in articulating—the ontological positions of its 
practitioners (and, in turn, those of its critics). Fortunately, much work has been done in 
recent years by philosophers on particularly the interpretation of duality, which can inform 
the string theory debate on exactly these issues.93 This will aid historiographical 
reconstruction of string theory’s implicit epistemology. 
Ontological conviction about what is most fundamental in our description of the world 
is tied to practice: in the black hole information paradox, for example, it can hardly be a 
surprise that traditionally many relativists have been much more inclined to go along with 
Hawking’s original semi-classical analysis of information loss, grounded in the causal structure 
 
88 See: https://www.lorentz.leidenuniv.nl/zaanen/wordpress/research/anti-de-sittercondensed-matter/, cited 
on 17 September 2020; for an overview of the subject see their book: Zaanen et al. (2015); earlier contributions 
to the subject include Hartnoll et al. (2007, 2008); strong criticism of the general applicability of the AdS/CFT 
correspondence to condensed matter systems has also been expressed by one of the latter’s leading scholars; 
see Anderson (2013).   
89 Dieks et al. (2015).   
90 Polchinksi (2019a), pp. 349, 346 respectively; Strominger and Vafa (1996). 
91 For a discussion of particularly this point, see Van Dongen et al. (2020), pp. 115-117; see also De Haro et al. 
(2020) for more on the Strominger-Vafa analysis from an HPS perspective. 
92 Smolin (2006a), pp. 139-141. 
93 See e.g. Rickles (2011, 2013); Matsubara (2013); Dieks et al. (2015); Castellani (2017); Castellani and De Haro 
(2020); De Haro and Butterfield (2019); De Haro et al. (2017); De Haro (2019, 2020), Read (2016). 
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of the black hole spacetime, than the field theorists’ insistence on quantum unitarity.94 In this 
sense, identity and ontological conviction matter: they condition positions on explanation and 
understanding. Thus, Joseph Polchinksi expressed surprise that Ellis and Silk do not agree with 
the multiverse scenario, and are apparently content to leave the value of the cosmological 
constant up to measurement,95 without any further need for ‘explanation’. An important 
element for Polchinski’s’ own argument for the multiverse is in fact autobiographical—his 
personal struggle with Weinberg’s anthropic reasoning and eventually his own realization of 
its possibility in string theory. In the end, as we saw, many of Polchinski’s arguments for string 
theory as physics, are arguments that articulate what it means to be a good physicist; that 
express what kind of practice is epistemically virtuous.  
 
Conclusion  
Polchinski and Silverstein are opinion-leaders in string theory, and have been among the first 
to attempt to articulate the epistemic practice of their subject; this is important and 
immensely useful for philosophers. Their standards of explanation and what exactly 
constitutes the ‘empirical’ have been shown above to differ considerably from those of string 
theory’s critics. Yet, heterodox opinions of what may be considered ‘empirical’ and 
‘predictive’ should not be taken to signal that these labels are unjustly applied, but simply 
that a substantial group of scholars, who emphatically do consider themselves physicists, 
consider certain types of argument as epistemically relevant to, and valid expressions of 
empirical science, while others will disagree. These judgments are expressions of different 
cultures of rationality, rooted in different practices of theory: namely, in the use of string 
theory, or its absence. This does suggest that discussions about normative methodological 
prescriptions—and this has been the main thrust of this paper—will probably not be resolved 
and may not even substantially inform the stalemate in the current controversy. Yet, as I have 
tried to argue, historiography, when sufficiently sensitive to string theory’s implicit 
epistemology, might.  
Lee Smolin (2006a, pp. 301-303) has stated that democratic dissent on the basis of 
shared and publicly available evidence is a necessary element of science. What the preceding 
section has shown, however, is that what is construed as evidence is inherently conditioned 
by disciplinary culture; and that it is that conditioning that drives dissent in the first place. 
Indeed, all participants in the debate on string theory are convinced that they uphold proper 
standards of rationality, yet disagree on what those are. The contentious and even emotional 
nature of the debate is ultimately due to its personal nature, exactly because at stake is what 
it means to be a physicist: different positions in the crisis in fundamental physics are linked to 
different senses of virtue and identity—and consequently even different versions of Einstein.  
 
94 Van Dongen and De Haro, forthcoming; talks at EPSA 2019, Geneva; ‘t Hooft meeting, Utrecht, 2019; 
Information paradox philosophy workshop, Cambridge, 2019; GGI workshop non-empirical physics, Florence, 
2019; see further e.g. Van Dongen and De Haro (2004); Susskind (2008).  
95 At least, that is how Polchinksi (2019b, p. 362) interprets their mention of unimodular gravity as alternative 
to a multiverse account.  
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The sentiment expressed by string theorists, whatever their reasoning, is that there 
can be explanatory power in exclusively theoretical argumentation. That point has been 
developed by Dawid (2013, 2017), who argues that theories that provide ‘unexpected 
explanations of additional phenomena’, or theories for which ‘no alternative’ can be 
conceived, particularly when those theories are built on methods that have proven successful 
in the past, do deserve additional epistemic confidence. These epistemic warrants apply to 
string theory, Dawid claims, and should be given proper authority as they function as such in 
the field: in his opinion, the sustained prominence of string theory entails that philosophers 
of science need to revise their traditional accounts of confirmation and accept such novel 
non-empirical norms.  
Yet, citing Kuhn, I have made the case that such norms need not be considered so very 
novel; and more importantly, that scientific rationality is not captured by reductive accounts 
of confirmation, but is rather more akin to something like reasoned judgement on the basis 
of incomplete information; that principles and maxims are weighed, like values are weighed 
in moral judgment. Whatever value then prevails is strongly related to what ideal circulates 
of how a scholar should be. Such ideals and the values that they represent are furthermore 
shared socially: they are inherently social. Yet, some scholars express frustration at “social […] 
biases” they observe in the assessment of theory today (Oriti 2019, p. 149; Hossenfelder 
2017)—yet, most recent historiography will insist that criteria of rationality are inherently 
social: values only have force if they are shared. Indeed, shared norms of assessment and 
principle are exactly what build a discipline.  
Demarcation and its criteria have a social function: they function to exclude certain 
practices and people from the discipline proper—qualifying a research tradition as non-
scientific, or to be “rather regarded as philosophy” (Ellis 2017, p. 33), does exactly that. Yet 
the vast majority working in the tradition of string theory are in fact employed by physics 
departments.  
The crisis in physics is both inextricably social and epistemic: it is a crisis of identity. So 
here is a resolution. Let us accept that this is an example of incommensurability, and embrace 
the need to fashion a novel identity in what is still “a no-man’s land between mathematics, 
physics and philosophy” (Ellis and Silk 2014, p. 321). That is what Einstein tried to do for his 
unified field theory work, and Galileo achieved when he secured his job as court philosopher 
in Florence. In this sense, I do agree with Richard Dawid that philosophers—and physicists—
should accept that there has been a “shift of the scientific paradigm” (Dawid 2006, p. 301). I 
further would like to propose a name for the new non-empirical paradigm, honoring its 
Kantian credentials: let’s call it ‘meta’-physics, and keep funding it as generously as before.  
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